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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : Case No. 20020002-SC 
v. : 
ERIC JARVIS WARREN, : Priority No. 15 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) &-2(5) (1996 & 
Supp. 2001). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Is the fact that traffic stops are inherently dangerous one of the "totality of the 
circumstances " that must be examined in determining the reasonableness of a protective 
frisk during a traffic stop? 
On certiorari review, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of appeals, not 
the decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). The 
court of appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, f 8, 
13 P.3d 576. "The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that 
court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of 
review." Id. The trial court's factual findings underlying its decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
939 n.4 (Utah 1994); accord State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 8, 6 P.3d 1133. The trial 
court's conclusions of law based on those findings are reviewed for correctness, "with a 
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the 
facts." Pena, 869 P.2d at 936-39; accord Veteto, 2000 UT 62, at % 8. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTE AND RULES 
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine and cocaine, both 
third degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 
1999); carrying a concealed knife, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-10-504 (1999); and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (1998 & Supp. 1999) (R14-16). 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence (R43-44), (R49-56). Following an 
evidentiary hearing and oral argument, the trial court denied the motion and entered 
written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R64, 82-86). The trial court 
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determined that bnef questioning as to why defendant was in the area at that late hour did 
not impermissibly extend the scope of the traffic stop (id.). Further, the trial court ruled 
that the Terry frisk of defendant was justified by reasonable safety concerns given the 
officer's suspicion that defendant had just engaged in drug or prostitution activity, the 
lateness of the hour, the isolated downtown area, defendant's inconsistent explanation of 
his activities (including his lie about the status of his license) and the need to impound 
defendant's Cadillac (id.). 
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the cocaine charge and 
was sentenced to an indeterminate statutory term of from zero-to-five years, to be served 
consecutively to any term defendant was then serving (R108). 
On direct appeal, a divided panel of the Utah Court of Appeals reversed. State v. 
Warren, 2001 UT App 346,11,434 Utah Adv. Rep. 31. Observing that "iesser traffic 
offenses' are not suggestive of weapons," and that neither the lateness of the hour nor 
defendant's lie about the validity of his license individually raised safety concerns, the 
majority concluded that the protective frisk was not justified by a reasonable suspicion 
that defendant was armed. Id. at f 16, n.4. 
Having determined that the frisk was unlawful, the majority declined to address 
whether the stop was permissibly extended by the officer's brief questioning as to why 
defendant was in the area at that late hour. Id. at f 16, n.5. 
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Finally, the majority declined to remand for the trial court to consider possible 
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. at fflf 17-19. 
The dissent concurred that the protective frisk was unjustified, but disagreed with 
the majority's refusal to remand for consideration of the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
A/, at U 26. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
At approximately 4:45 a.m., on 28 November 1999, Officer Swensen saw 
defendant's Cadillac pulled over at 170 South, just north of the intersection, at 200 East 
in Salt Lake City, Utah (R129:2-4). Defendant was in the driver's seat, and another 
person was leaning into the open front passenger door (R129:4). While the officer 
watched, the person leaning into the Cadillac shut the door and walked away (id.). 
Officer Swensen became suspicious of potential drug or prostitution activity because 
there were no businesses open at that hour and no residences in the area (Rl29:4-5). 
Thereafter, defendant pulled away and made a left turn and also changed lanes without 
signaling (R 129:4). Officer Swensen stopped defendant for the traffic violations and 
requested his license, registration, and insurance (R129:4, 14). Defendant provided 
registration and his driver's license, which had expired in 1995 (id.). Defendant said he 
lOn certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals and applies 
the same standard of review applied by that court. State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 3, 
985 P.2d 911. The court of appeals reviews the facts in the record in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress. State v. 
Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997). 
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had a current license, but claimed it had been stolen (R129:6). Prior to running a 
computer check, Officer Swensen briefly asked what defendant was doing in the area 
(R129:7). Defendant said that he had just dropped an acquaintance off after being 
together at someone's house (R129:8). Defendant also claimed to be looking for packing 
boxes for this sister (Id.). 
Officer Swensen returned to his patrol vehicle to check on defendant's license 
(R129:17). The report indicated the renewal of defendant's license had been denied 
because of unpaid reinstatement fees (R129:7). Officer Swensen therefore determined to 
impound the Cadillac and to cite defendant for the traffic violations and for driving 
without a license (R129:8). He asked defendant to step out of the Cadillac to accomplish 
these purposes (id.). 
As defendant stepped from the Cadillac, Officer Swensen asked if he had any 
weapons and defendant said "No" (R129:19). The officer asked defendant to turn 
around and put his hands on the back of his head in preparation for a Terry frisk: 
"Whenever I pull somebody out of a car, I perform a Terry frisk just to see if there's 
weapons. Also because of the fact that there being drug activity and prostitution and so 
on, people that are involved in that usually carry weapons.. ."2 (R129:9, 19). During the 
frisk, a white plastic twist of cocaine fell from defendant's waist (R129:20). 
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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Defendant was arrested on drug charges (id.). A search of defendant's person 
incident to his arrest revealed more drugs and a glass pipe (R58). During an inventory 
search of defendant's impounded Cadillac, police uncovered a knife concealed under the 
armrest (R16). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals' decision sends a conflicting and confusing message to lower 
courts attempting to evaluate the reasonableness of a protective frisk performed during 
the course of a traffic stop. First, the court of appeals ignores this Court's recognition 
that all traffic stops are inherently dangerous. Second, the court of appeals fails to 
reference or otherwise apply the mandatory totality of circumstances standard in its 
evaluation of the protective frisk. 
A proper evaluation of the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer in 
this case, including the traffic stop context, defendant's immediately preceding activity, 
the unusually early hour, the isolated downtown location, and defendant's lie about the 
validity of his license, demonstrate that the protective frisk was reasonable. Even if a 
corrected analysis would not change the result here, to avoid confusion in the lower 
courts, this Court should reaffirm its recognition that all traffic stops are inherently 
dangerous and that reviewing courts must take that factor into account when evaluating 
the reasonableness of police conduct under the totality of the circumstances. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE FACT THAT TRAFFIC STOPS ARE INHERENTLY 
DANGEROUS IS ONE OF THE "TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES" THAT MUST BE EXAMINED IN 
DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF A PROTECTIVE 
FRISK DURING A TRAFFIC STOP 
In State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, 37 P.3d 270, the court of appeals reversed 
the trial court's determination that Officer Swensen's frisk of defendant was justified by 
a reasonable suspicion that defendant was potentially armed. In so ruling, the court of 
appeals held that "'lesser traffic offenses' are not suggestive of weapons" (quotation 
omitted), and thus the fact that the frisk occurred in the context of a traffic stop is 
irrelevant. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346, f 16, n.4. This view is at odds with this 
Court's recognition that "concerns relating to officer safety" during traffic stops are 
"inherent." State v. James, 2000 UT 80, J 10, n.3, 13 P.3d 576 (citing Knowles v. Iowa, 
525 U.S. 13, 117-118 (1998) and Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-110 
(1977)). See also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,414(1997). 
Moreover, the court of appeals' refusal to acknowledge the above controlling 
precedent illustrates that courts' over-arching failure to consider the totality of the 
circumstances confronting Officer Swensen at the time of the frisk. See State v. Kohl, 
2000 UT 35, K 11, 99 P.2d 7 ("While the required level of suspicion is lower than the 
standard for probable cause to arrest, 'the same totality of facts and circumstances 
approach is used to determine if there are sufficient "specific and articulable facts" to 
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support reasonable suspicion" (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (additional 
citations omitted)). Indeed, the mandatory totality of circumstances standard, see United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750 (2002), is not referenced in the court 
of appeals' opinion. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346, ff 9-16. Accordingly, this Court 
should reverse and reaffirm that all traffic stops are inherently dangerous, and that this 
inherent danger must be considered in determining the reasonableness of police conduct. 
The Fourth Amendment Standard: Reasonableness. "The touchstone of [an] 
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the 
circumstances of the particular government invasion of a citizen's personal security.'" 
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19). In other words, 
"[t]he Fourth Amendment is n o t . . . a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but 
only against unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 
681(1985). As noted above, in determining the propriety of a particular detention, or in 
this case, a protective frisk, the reviewing court must consider the totality of the 
circumstances confronting the officer at the time. See Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750 
("When discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion 
determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the 'totality of the 
circumstances' of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a 'particularized and 
objective basis' for suspecting legal wrongdoing") (citation omitted). See also State v. 
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987) (recognizing that courts must view totality of 
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circumstances in determining reasonable suspicion). Arvizu emphasizes that the totality 
of circumstances review "allows officers to draw on their own experience and 
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative 
information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.'" Id. at 
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981). 
Additionally, given the dangers inherent in all traffic stops, police are entitled to 
take reasonable precautionary actions to ensure their safety during the course of a traffic 
investigation. James, 2000 UT 80, ^ f 10 (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-111); State v. 
O 'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah App. 1998). See also United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 
1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001) {en banc). Indeed, "[o]wing to the inherent safety concerns 
and the limited nature of the intrusion, officers may order the occupants of a vehicle to 
leave the vehicle during the course of the investigation." James, 2000 UT 80, f 10 (citing 
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-111). As further recognized by this Court, ""[i]t is clear that the 
safety concerns guiding the Supreme Court's decision in Mimms do not depend on any 
particular showing that an officer was at heightened risk due to the unique circumstances 
of a given automobile s top, . . . but rather are of an inherent and general nature." James, 
2000 UT 80, f 10. Recognizing the inherent danger in all traffic stops, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recently held that police do not need a particularized suspicion that the 
occupants of a vehicle are armed and dangerous before they may ask about the presence 
of loaded weapons. Holt, 264, F.3d at 1225. 
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Considering the Totality of the Circumstances the Instant Protective Fri was 
Justified. Notwithstanding the inherent danger, the usual motorist stopped for traffic 
violations is not ordinarily subjected to a protective frisk. Here, the court of appeals' 
flawed analysis resulted in that court's failure to recognize that defendant was not the 
usual motorist. First, Officer Swensen observed more than just the traffic violations 
which served as the basis for the stop. He also saw an unidentified individual leaning 
into defendant's passenger side door from the curb for no apparent legitimate reason, 
given the deserted downtown location and the unusually early hour (R 129:4-5, 15). 
Based on the officer's experience, that behavior, at that hour, and in that location, was 
consistent with a possible drug or prostitution offense (id.). See Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 750-
751. It is well established that otherwise innocent actions may aggregate into reasonable 
suspicion. Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 751 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22). Moreover, 
defendant's suspicious conduct immediately preceded the traffic violations for which he 
was ultimately stopped (R129:4-5, 15). 
Second, defendant initially produced a driver's license that had expired four years 
earlier and then lied to Officer Swensen, claiming that he had a current license, but that it 
had recently been stolen (Rl29:6-7). Upon learning from dispatch that defendant in fact 
had no valid license, Officer Swensen determined the Cadillac would have to be 
impounded (R 129:9). 
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Finally, while Officer Swensen did not suspect that defendant was necessarily 
carrying a weapon when he asked him to step from Cadillac (R129:19), it was his 
experience that traffic stops are potentially dangerous (R129:9). Officer Swensen's 
concern was both real and reasonable. "In 1994 alone, there were 5, 672 officer assaults 
and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413. 
Moreover, approximately 30% of police shootings occur when an officer approaches a 
suspect seated in a vehicle. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 n.13 (1983); see 
also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973) (FBI report indicates that 
11 of 35 police officers murdered in a three-month period were killed when the officers 
were making a traffic stop); W. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure, § 9.5(a), at 254-255 n.33 
(3rd ed. 1996) (more officers are shot while conducting field interrogations than while 
dealing with known felons, and 43% of officer shootings occurring pursuant to a vehicle 
stop take place after the initial contact has been made). Utah is not immune from the 
national trend. See Angie Welling, Officer's death shocks Lehi, Deseret News, August 5, 
2001, at A1 (copy attached). See, e.g., State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ff 2-5, 994 P.2d 177 
(passenger in traffic stop shoots at officer after ignoring repeated requests to show his 
hands); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1989) (driver shot at officer without 
warning as officer approached vehicle). 
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In sum, viewing the circumstances confronting Officer Swensen at the time of the 
frisk as a whole, including consideration of the fact that all traffic stops are potentially 
dangerous, defendant's suspicious behavior immediately prior to the stop, and his lie 
about the validity of his driver's license after the stop, it cannot be said that the officer 
acted unreasonably in frisking defendant for weapons before proceeding to impound the 
Cadillac. Moreover, the measure of discretion to be accorded the trial court's decision 
below compels affirmance under a proper application of the totality of circumstances 
standard. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-939 (Utah 1994); State v. Veteto, 2000 
U T 6 2 , t 8 , 6 P . 3 d l l 3 3 . 
The Court of Appeals Erroneously Rejected Specific Circumstances of This 
Traffic Stop in Isolation From Each Other. Rather than viewing the above 
circumstances collectively, the court of appeals erroneously viewed them in isolation 
from each other. For example, the court of appeals notes that '"lesser traffic offenses' 
are not suggestive of weapons. Nor is the lateness of the hour. Similarly, lying about the 
status of one's driver's license does not suggest the presence of weapons." Warren, 2001 
UT App 346, f 17 n.4. The court of appeals' cursory analysis is similar to the "divide-
and-conquer" approach the United States Supreme Court rejected in Arvizu. 122 S.Ct. at 
750. 
In Arvizu, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated and rejected in isolation 
from each other several factors that border patrol agents relied on in determining that 
12 
Arvizu was engaged in illicit trafficking. Id. Criticizing the Ninth Circuit's approach, 
the Supreme Court observed that the lower court "appeared to believe that each 
observation by [the agent] that was by itself readily susceptible to an innocent 
explanation was entitled to "'no weight.'" Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court 
reaffirmed that Terry "precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis." Arvizu, 122 
S.Ct. at 750. Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he officer in Terry observed 
the petitioner and his companions repeatedly walk back and forth, look into a store 
window, and confer with one another. Although each of the series of acts was 'perhaps 
innocent in itself,' we held that, taken together, they 'warranted further investigation.'" 
Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 750 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22). See also United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (holding that factors which by themselves are "consistent" 
with innocence collectively constitute reasonable suspicion). 
* * * 
Based on the above, this Court should reverse the court of appeals and clarify that 
the danger inherent in all traffic stops is a necessary consideration in any evaluation of 
the reasonableness of police conduct during a traffic stop, and that the circumstances 
must be considered as a totality. James, 2000 UT 80, f 10, n.3. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 
108-109 ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 
'reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a 
citizen's personal security'" (emphasis added)). The court of appeals' failure to consider 
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this salient fact under the totality of circumstances standard resulted in that court's failure 
to recognize that the protective frisk was a reasonable safety precaution. However, even 
if correction of the court of appeals' analysis does not change the result here, the 
confusion in the lower courts will remain unless this Court reaffirms James's recognition 
that all traffic stops are inherently dangerous and that reviewing courts must take that 
factor into account when evaluating the reasonableness of police conduct under the 
totality of the circumstances. 2000 UT 80, f 10, n.3; Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 750. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals' conflicting and confusing analysis should be reversed and 
remanded.3 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on _ / July 2002. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
3While the majority also rejected the State's argument that the frisk was 
alternatively justified under the inevitable discovery doctrine, remand is necessary 
because the court of appeals did not address the issue whether the officer's brief 
questioning unduly prolonged the traffic stop prior to the frisk. See rjrarren, 2001 UT 
App346,f 16n.5,f 22. 
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Deseret News, Sunday, August 05, 2001 
Officer's death shocks Lehi 
These kind of things don't happen here,' resident says 
By Angie Welling with Gib Twyman, Sharon Haddock and Brady Snyder 
Deseret News staff writers 
LEHI — Word of the death of police officer Joseph D. Adams in the line of duty spread 
slowly through this small Utah County town Saturday. And when the news hit, it hit hard. 
"This'll be a hard time for Lehi," predicted Assistant 
Fire Chief Bret Hutchings, swiping gently at his 
tear-filled eyes. "You think little Lehi, these things 
just don't happen." 
Flags throughout the community of 19,000 flew at 
half-staff Saturday as investigators continued to 
examine the Friday night gunfight that left Adams 
dead and another man critically injured. Details 
remain sketchy, for police are releasing little 
information. 
From Hutchings' family-owned appliance store just 
two blocks from the empty police station — Utah 
County deputy sheriffs patrolled the town Saturday to allow Lehi officers time to grieve in 
private — he spoke fondly about the 26-year-old man killed during what began as a routine 
traffic stop. 
"He's the kind of guy that gave everybody a fair shake," Hutchings said. "He did the police 
job so well. He was well-liked by everybody." 
Three of Adams' friends spent the afternoon cleaning the blood from the road where the 
officer died. 
This is an honor to come here and do this for Joe. He was my best friend," said Doug 
Fannen as he and two others used bleach and scouring pads to remove blood stains from the 
pavement. 
Adams had served on Lehi's 26-member police force for three years. He leaves behind a wife, 
Cydney, and an 8-month-oid son. 
"You feel he's got to be in a better place than here, but it's so sad for his young family," 
Hutchings said. "And that's where our hearts will be." 
Wayne Keith, left, Doug Fannen and 
Ford Fannen, friends of slain Lehi 
police officer Joseph D, Adams, scrub 
blood Saturday from the roadside 
where Adams was shot. 
Scott G. Winterton, Deseret News 
http://deseretnews.com/dn/print/1,1442,295015 772,00.html? 8.1401 
Family members at Adams' Orem home on Saturday declined to comment when contacted 
bv the Deseret News. 
Joseph D. Adams leaves 
behind a wife and son. 
Associated Press 
West Valley City. 
Lehi Police Chief Karl Zimmerman said Adams will be missed. 
"It's bad," Zimmerman said about the mood within his 
department. "Everybody s really hurting." 
According to police, Adams stopped a suspected drunken driver 
at 2100 N. 1200 West just before 11 p.m. Friday. Adams 
reportedly ticketed the man for DUI and asked him to step out 
of his vehicle. In the process of being handcuffed, the man was 
somehow able to free one hand, grab a small handgun and begin 
shooting, Utah County Sheriffs Sgt. Dennis Harris said. 
A wounded Adams was still able to shoot the assailant 
numerous times before the man got into his car and drove away 
with Adams' handcuffs dangling from one wrist. 
Police have identified the man as Arturo Javier Scott Welch, 23, 
Adams was shot at least twice, once on the left side of his chest a mere fraction of an inch 
above his protective vest, and once in the leg. He was flown by medical helicopter to LDS 
Hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 12:13 a.m. Saturday. 
Shortly after the shooting, Salt Lake County sheriffs deputies arrested Welch at a gas station 
at 11400 S. State in Draper. A license plate check on the red Chevrolet Cavalier Welch drove 
some 15 miles from Lehi to Draper indicates the vehicle was not registered to Welch. Police 
would not release information about the owner of the vehicle. 
Welch was also airlifted to LDS Hospital, where he remained in critical condition Saturday 
night with multiple gunshot wounds to the abdomen, spokesman Jess Gomez said. 
A search of court records indicates Welch was cited 
in April with a class B misdemeanor DUI and four 
class C misdemeanors, including driving with an 
open container. He pleaded not guilty to those 
charges in July, and an Aug. 17 pretrial conference 
is scheduled in that case-
In 1996, Welch also pleaded guilty to fleeing from a 
peace officer and possession of alcohol by a minor, 
both class B misdemeanors. A third misdemeanor 
count of vehicle burglary was dismissed. 
Friday night, a passenger exited Welch's vehicle 
sometime during the gunfight. The man, whom 
Jeremy Eiswood places flowers near 
where fellow officer Joseph D. Adams 
was slain. 
Scoff G. Winterton, Deseret Sews 
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police hd\ e identified only as an "acquaintance' of Welch, dialed 911 on his ceil phone dnc 
waited for police to arrive. 
Harris described the man, who was questioned and released Saturday morning, as Very 
forthcoming. I believe he's helped out the detectives quite a bit." 
Officers arrived almost immediately and began performing CPR on Adams within minutes, 
said Hutchings, who was among the emergency personnel called to the emotional scene. 
"There was a lot of crying going on here last night, from the chief on down," Hutchings said. 
"None of us wanted to leave the scene. We just kind of stood there in amazement." 
State Sen. John Valentine, R-Orem, said his community is feeling a deep sense of loss over 
the slain officer. So is the Utah County Sheriffs Search and Rescue Team, of which Valentine 
is a part. 
"Our unit is fairly somber right now. One of our lieutenants was among the first on the scene 
and administered CPR to Officer Adams, so it's hitting him especially hard," Valentine said. 
"We had a training exercise at Bridal Veil Falls (Saturday) morning, and it was extremely 
difficult for everyone to get going, thinking about another peace officer being shot." 
State and county counseling teams are coordinating 
efforts to assist officers, dispatchers and staff 
members in dealing with the shock. 
The entire town of Lehi is dazed, convenience store 
clerk Karla Glodowski said. The shooting dominated 
conversations inside the store all day Saturday, she 
said. 
Mourners embrace where Lehi police "You have to keep hearing about it before it sinks in 
officer Joseph D. Adams was shot and because it's still a small town," Glodowski said. 
killed Friday night. ^ ^ ^
 o f t h i n g s d o n > t h a p p e n h e r e ;» 
Jason Olson. Deseret Sews ^ r ^ 
Adams' death comes less than a month after similar tragedy rocked another small Utah 
town. 
Roosevelt Police Chief Cecil Gurr was shot and killed July 6 after responding to a domestic 
dispute in a convenience store parking lot. Lee Roy Wood, Vernal, is charged with capital 
murder and could face the death penalty. 
"I think the citizens of Utah should really take this as a warning. We're a state that's growing, 
and with that increase brings good people and bad people," Harris said. "This is a wake-up 
call to the citizens of Utah and to the police officers of Utah." 
Lehi City Councilman Johnny Barnes agreed and issued a call that 
Adams' death not be in vain. 
"I want it to be a wake-up call for people, a motivation to get on the ball, 
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get imoKed. teach our Kids, not just point fingers." Barnes said. 'I think 
we can use this to uplift and help by getting involved in service." 
Valentine said anytime a police officer goes down it creates shock waves 
both for law-abiding citizens and the peace-keeping fraternity — Arturo Javier 
especially with the recent spate of fatal shootings. S c o t t W e l c h 
"We are grieved at the loss of yet another officer in the line of duty/1 Valentine said. "Being a 
police officer is a very risky endeavor. Every time he or she goes out, they face this 
possibility. 
"And yet they do keep going out because they are professionals. Now we've lost one of our 
own out of our city, and it is hard to find the words to express how extremely upsetting it is 
to us all." 
An Arts in the Parks "Country Showcase" program scheduled for tonight has been dedicated 
to Adams and the sacrifice he made for the community. The event will start at 7 p.m. in 
Wines Park, 600 N. 100 East in Lehi. A trust fund for Adams' family has been established at 
the Lehi branch of the Bank of American Fork. Donations can be made by calling the bank at 
766-1000. 
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